

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. George Bush		
2	Director Central		
3	Intelligence		
4			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE

US Arms Control & Disarmament
Washington, D.C. 20451

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002400030001-7

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO.

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


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State Department review completed

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DDI-3543-76



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

Copy 1 .

May 18, 1976

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Downgrading the Classification of "The
Fact of: Photosatellites [redacted]
[redacted] Products

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It is my understanding that the subject downgrading actions are under active consideration. I have read some of the arguments for and against such actions but have not seen any considerations of how such actions might impact treaty verification and, hence, the viability of our arms limitation efforts now and in the foreseeable future.

1) Downgrading/Declassification of "The Fact of"
Photosatellites:

The purpose of keeping classified "the fact of" is not, of course, to keep the existence of a US satellite reconnaissance program "secret", but to restrain public discussion of a vital and sensitive intelligence program and to avoid the need for official recognition of such a program which might lead to a succession of further inquiries and disclosures. Although the "confidential" level of classification would restrain public discussion and avoid the need for official recognition of "the fact of" it is not clear what would be gained by downgrading. It implies lessening of concern about avoiding official recognition, invites broader discussion, and moves us closer to declassification.

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I recommend against declassification of "the fact of" photosatellites. If we discontinued the present policy of avoiding discussion of this program in public forum this could result in

- [REDACTED]
- embarrassing the Governments of countries where our ground stations are located and jeopardizing future agreements on ground stations or completion of stations under construction;
 - further aggravating political pressures on the Soviets toward concealment;
 - increasing the scope and fervor of the international debate about unauthorized data gathering which is already in progress in the UN with respect to Earth Resources Imaging Satellites;
 - jeopardizing the efficacy of [REDACTED] which I consider vital for treaty monitoring.

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2) Changing the Classification of [REDACTED]
Products

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In developing a new, presumably more efficient classification policy, security concerns must be traded-off against the potential benefits which might accrue from greater access to sensitive products. Undoubtedly many users have legitimate needs for greater access to more information. From ACDA's viewpoint, the merits of these requirements and the concomitant changes in product classification must be judged with respect to an important criterion: whether or not the contemplated changes in classification increase the likelihood of divulging to the Soviets the capabilities of those satellite systems which provide verification information. The requirements of arms control verification argue for continuation of the tightest security concerning our capabilities with respect to:

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I would also urge that the US continue its policy of being non-specific which systems are National Technical Means of Verification. Any distinction between "NTMs" and "non-NTMs" which may creep in as a result of classification policies, access control, or break-out of certain satellite reconnaissance systems from the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) could lead to serious problems down the road with respect to the protection afforded our verification assets by the non-interference provisions of present and future arms limitation treaties.

Fred C. Ikle
Fred C. Ikle

cc: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs

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Cover Memo

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24 May 1976

NOTE FOR: The Director
FROM : Ed Proctor ☐
SUBJECT : Ikle Letter on Classification
of Satellite Reconnaissance

Ikle has written you the attached letter urging that no changes be made in the security aspects of satellite reconnaissance.

Not only is he against declassifying the fact of satellite reconnaissance, he is also against reclassifying it at the Confidential level. He says even the latter would imply a lessening of concern about the program's security and would move us closer to declassification of the fact. He then presents a list of horrors that "could result" from a change.

Ikle says that the requirements of arms control verification argue for continuation of the tightest security for the products of the program. He lists five specific aspects which need protection.

I disagree with Ikle's judgment with regard to the classification of the fact of satellite reconnaissance. I believe that the way the products of the program are handled

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FILE

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ACTION

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can be changed without endangering the sensitive aspects of the program. Obviously, these are things I will be working on next month.

Although Ikle's letter does not require an answer, you may want to acknowledge its receipt. Do you want me to draft a short reply for your signature?

YES X NO

A RELATED MATTER ATTACHED.

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	D/DCI/IC		✓		
4	S/MC				
5	DDS&T				
6	DDI	✓			
7	DDA				
8	DDO				
9	D/DCI/NIO				
10	GC				
11	LC				
12	IG				
13	Compt				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/S				
16	DTR				
17	Asst/DCI				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPS				
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

*For review & recommendation
to DCI, who has not seen*